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COMMENTS
of the tax consequences of creating powers of appointment and rights
of withdrawal. As discussed earlier, discretionary power in the inde-
pendent trustee to pay principal of the trust to the life tenant may be
a practical solution to a decedent's desire that the life tenant be adequately
maintained.
The problem of ultimate distribution of assets from the trust may be
best disposed of by the life tenant, due to his closeness to the situation.
The plan envisioned by the decedent may not be adequate or appropriate
for the requirements of the family and events may occur that were not
foreseen when the original plan was conceived. For these reasons, the
power of appointment and the right of withdrawal add maximum flexi-
bility to the estate plan and will be important parts of the estate plan
for protection of family members. The experienced attorney must be
cognizant of the tax implications these powers entail when their use is
contemplated and the trust agreement is drafted.
Harry Sachrison
FREEDOM OF THE ROAD: PUBLIC
SAFETY v. PRIVATE RIGHT
INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of motor vehicles, there have been great changes in our
society. The character of crime has been altered drastically, and some of
the new methods used to combat it have raised serious problems vis-a-vis
the protection of individual liberties, esFecially the liberty to be free
from unreasonable search. An examination of the present state of the law
concerning the stopping and searching of vehicles, and its evolution over
the last half-century, suggests some general solutions which might be
successfully applied. Some would entail changes in our present law, but
not in the basic constitutional doctrines. Others would result from the
examination, substitution, or rejection of solutions already proposed.
RECENT SOURCES OF THE RIGHT
At common law, a man's property right in his home was sacred and
the breach of its security could only be accomplished by careful use of a
search warrant, no matter how lowly he stood among the King's subjects.'
1 Sir William Pitt (the Elder) stated in Parliament: "The poorest man may in his
cottage bid defiance to all the force of the Crown. It may be frail-its roof may shake
-the wind may blow through it-the storm may enter, the rain may enter-but the
King of England cannot enter-all his forces dares not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement!" 15 HANSARD, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1753-65) 1307, cited
in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1959)..
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The American colonists felt that they deserved the same rights as native
Englishmen and were greatly disturbed when Parliament sought to en-
force the Acts of Trade by the use of general writs of assistance.2 There
had been a gradual erosion of liberties in England since the changes of
the Glorious Revolution of 1688; the abolition of the Court of Star
Chamber altered the form, but not the reality, of the continued suppres-
sion of personal liberty and breaches of security of the home.3 Two
hundred years ago, in the classic case of Entick v. Carrington, Lord
Camden held a general warrant to seize a man's papers illegal and void
warning that the people would not long tolerate such practices.4 Popular
resistance already existed in America, but Parliament, choosing not to
recognize it, passed the Townshend Acts, which permitted virtually un-
limited and arbitrary search and seizure for violation of the customs
sections of His Majesty's Excise.5
English legal opinion was quick to declare the nullity of such proce-
dures," but American popular opinion was quick to find a stronger remedy.7
The states incorporated the rights to privacy and freedom from search
and seizure in their new constitutions." It was generally agreed:
[T]hat the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses papers and
possessions free from search and seizure and therefore warrants without oaths
or affirmations first made, affording sufficient foundation for them . . . are
contrary to that right and ought not to be granted.9
2 An Act for preventing frauds, etc., 13 and 14 CAR. II, c. 11, §§ 4 and 5 (1662); An
Act for preventing frauds . . . in the Plantation Trade, 7 and 8 WILL. III, c. 22, § 6
(1696).
3 Wilkes' Case, 2 Wilson's Rep. 150, 19 How. St. Tr. cols. 981, 1075, 1381 and 1405
(1763-70); Leach v. Money, 19 How. St. Tr. col. 1001, 1026-27 (1765); Wilkes v.
Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1154 (1765).
42 Wilson's Rep. 275, 19 How. St. Tr. col. 1029, 1074 (1765). Counsel for Plaintiff
urged: "A power to issue such a warrant as this is contrary to the genius of the law
of England and even if they had found what they searched for, they could not have
justified under it .... [Ilt now appears that this enormous trespass ... has been done
upon mere surmise. But the verdict says, such warrants have been granted by secretaries
of state ever since the Revolution. If they have, it is high time to put an end to them;
for if they are held to be legal, the liberty of this country is at an end." 19 How. St.
Tr. at 1038.
5 An act for granting certain duties, etc., 7 GEo. III, c. 46, § 10 (1767).
6 IV BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 289-91 (9th ed. 1783).
7 See Declaration and Resolves of Oct. 14, 1774, 1 JOURNALS OF THE AMERICAN CON-
cRESS 19-22 (1823).
8 See, e.g., Bill of Rights, VA. CONST. § 10 (1776); Delaware, Declaration of Rights,
§ 17 (September 11, 1776); Declaration of Rights, MD. CONST. art. XXIII (1776);
Declaration of Rights, VT. CoNsT. art. XI (1777); Bill of Rights, N.H. CONST. art. I,
§ XIX (1784).
9 Declaration of Rights, PA. CONST. art. X (1776). See supra note 8.
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Because of the intense anger caused by the persistent violation of this
right by the British, it is surprising that the right found no direct expres-
sion in either the Declaration of Independence, 10 or the Dickinson draft
of the Articles of Confederation."
The final draft of the Articles of Confederation did include a freedom
of movement clause which offered hope for a later formal recognition of
this right.1 2 Unfortunately, the right is enumerated neither in the Constitu-
tion nor in any of its amendments, although it is clearly "an accepted
ideal in this nation," and has been recognized in the courts.1 3 Only the
protection of privacy was enshrined in the fourth amendment:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .. 14
This was possibly due to the greater interest of the authors in the security
of property rather than in the security of persons, due to the liberal
common law rules of arrest. 15 Since the adoption of the Bill of Rights in
1791, the right to freedom of movement has been firmly tied to the
fourth amendment, as most of the harm dc.ne by a violation of the right
is due to searches incident to an arrest. Since it is the search which does
the harm, the law of arrest has remained generally unchanged, while the
search's relation to it has changed drastical]y."
Prior to 1914, the fourth amendment was applied to hold certain
searches illegal. 17 Holding the search illegal was of little benefit to the
10 1 JOURNALS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS supra note 7, at 394-96. However, there is
mention of interference with the right of free trade and commerce on the high seas.
id. at 395.
11 Id. at 408. See JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDIERATION 253-62 (1962).
12 Art. 4: ". . . [Tlhe people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to and
from any other state, .... " 2 JOURNALS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 330 (1777); Jensen,
supra note 11, at 263. See also UNITED NATIONS, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS art. 13, §§ 1 and 2 (1948).
13 Comment, Interference with the Right to Free Movement: Stopping and Search
of Vehicles, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 907, 908 (1963). See Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (73
U.S.) 35 (1867); Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 193 P.2d 470 (1948). Cf. Coakley,
Restrictions in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U. L. Rjiv. 2, 11-14 (1957).
14 The phrase "unreasonable search" was probably taken from "Every subject has
a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches. Declaration of Rights, MASS.
CONST. art. XIV (1780).
15 See Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment, 1960
SUPREME COURT REV. 46.
1 Id. at 47-51.
17Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), where the privilege against self-
incrimination in the fifth amendment was used to protect Boyd against the effects
of an illegal search.
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defendant, however, because "[c]ourts, in the administration of the
criminal law, [were] not accustomed to be oversensitive in regard to the
sources from which the evidence comes." s18 Then, just a half-century ago,
the Supreme Court put teeth into its determination by adopting the
"exclusionary rule" in Weeks v. United States,19 and drew from it a
rule of evidence for federal proceedings which would suppress evidence
gained by an illegal or unreasonable search. 20 This rule was affirmed
frequently 2' and finally was applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment in Mapp v. Ohio.22 In Ker v. California, the Court held that
the states could implement Mapp themselves by developing their own
working rules governing searches and seizures to meet "the practical
demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement," subject
to the Constitution and the exclusionary rule.23 It should be noted that
the Supreme Court has reserved to itself the jurisdiction to examine
claims that the states' rules may not conform to the Court's concept of
the exclusionary rule.24 Therefore, it becomes necessary to study the
evolution of the state and federal rules in order to understand the present
problems.
WHY THE AUTOMOBILE IS DIFFERENT
Automobiles are personal effects under the fourth amendment and thus
must be protected against unreasonable searches. 25 Therefore, any differ-
ence in the treatment of an auto from the treatment of other personal
18 Gindrat v. People, 138 111. 103, 110, 27 N.E. 1085, 1087 (1891).
19 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
20 Id. at 394, 398. This rule was probably first conceived in 1765 by Lord Camden
in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1073: "It is very certain, that the law
obligeth no man to accuse himself; because the necessary means of compelling self-
accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and
unjust; and it should seem that search for evidence is disallowed upon the same
principle. There too the innocent would be confounded with the guilty." (Emphasis
added.)
21 See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Gouled
v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
But see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), as to not pressing this requirement on
the states.
22 367 U.S. 643 (1961). All fifty states already had provisions similar, or equal to,
the fourth amendment in their state constitutions and many of them had adopted
the exclusionary rule on their own. VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES 5 n.
2, 53 et seq. (1961).
23 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963). See Specter, Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora's Problems for the
Prosecutor, 11 U. PA. L. REV. 4, 7-8 (1962).
24 Cf. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964),
rehearing denied, 377 U.S. 940 (1964); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
25 Robinson v. State, 197 Ind. 144, 140 N.E. 891 (1925). However, many cases seem
to treat an auto as a mobile premises. See infra notes 29 and 32.
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effects or premises must be by way of exception. Justice Frankfurter
explained this difference:
What is the test of reason which makes a search reasonable? The test is the
reason underlying and expressed by the Fourth Amendment: the history and
experience which it embodies and the safeguards afforded by it against the evils
to which it was a response. There must be a warrant to permit search barring
only inherent limitations upon that requirement when there is a good excuse
for not getting a search warrant, i.e. the justification that dispenses with
search warrants when searching the person in his extension, which is his body
and that which his body can immediately con trol, and motor vehicles.2 6
The basis for making an exception of a vehicle is that it is not fixed in
position. The Supreme Court first made the exception in Carroll v.
United States where Chief Justice Taft found:
[A] necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained,
and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon or automobile for contraband goods,
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quick-
ly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.27
This "doctrine of necessity" must be app ied carefully, as it is an attack
on a person's right which would not be tolerated except for the mobility
of the object to be searched.28 Therefore, while the exception is granted
to make law enforcement practical, the standard of reasonableness still
applies, and the failure to conform to it will render the search unlawful.2 9
The major concern will be whether there is sufficient probable cause to
justify the search. As this issue can be strongly disputed, it causes most
of the controversy in these cases.30
26 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (dissent).
27267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
28 Since the test is mobility and not speed, the exception has been extended to animal
drawn vehicles. Compare Taylor v. State, 129 Mis3. 815, 93 So. 355 (1922), and Quivers
v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 671, 115 S.E. 564 (1925) with Moore v. State, 138 Miss. 116,
103 So. 483 (1925).
29 Carroll v. United States, supra note 27; Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700
(1931); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); United States v. One 1946
Plymouth Sedan Automobile, 167 F.2d 3, 7 (7th Cir. 1948); Pettit v. State, 207 Ind.
478, 188 N.E. 784 (1934). Accord, United States v. Kancso, 252 F.2d 220, 224 (2d Cir.
1958), where Judge Moore held: "There is a vast difference between entering and
searching homes or even hotel rooms which are ... permanent locations and stopping
a car of a person on a highway for the same purpose. A warrant can usually be
obtained in the first situation without too much risk that the object of the search will
disappear. At least, in balance, protection under the Fourth Amendment outweighs
the possible advantage of search without a warrant. In the second situation the pedes-
trian on the street and the car on the highway will not obligingly preserve their
status quo; therefore, law enforcement agencies fmust act immediately."
3o See Justice McReynolds' dissent in Carroll v. United States, supra note 29, at 163,
170-75.
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It has been said that "[r]elaxation of the need to secure a warrant as
a prerequisite to searching a moving vehicle stemmed from the impracti-
ciality of compelling police to control the vehicle while a warrant is being
sought."''3 The three criteria for permitting such a search are: (1) the
suspect may escape, (2) he may attack the arresting officer, and (3) he
may cause the evidence to be removed or destroyed. However, a search
is not allowed where it is not impractical to get a warrant because the
auto is immobile.3 2 Also, where the suspect has been arrested and, because
he is in custody, there is no longer danger of attack, escape or destruction
of evidence, the search will be held unreasonable.33 These are applica-
tions of the standard of reasonableness. By the same standard, it can be
found that the mere fact of immobility is not sufficient. When a parked
auto seemed about to be used for illegal transport and was capable of
leaving immediately, unlike the situation where the driver is in custody,
a search was held valid.3 Before proceeding further, the ways in which
a search can be made must be examined.
WHEN A SEARCH CAN BE MADE
A lawful search can always be made when a valid search warrant has
been issued for an automobile.3 5 Items found during such a search, which
are the fruits of a crime other than the one which caused the warrant to
be issued, can be seized and used in evidence.3 But, where a warrant has
been issued on a defective affidavit, it will not affect the admission of
evidence where there was sufficient probable cause to stop the auto,
arrest the suspect and search the auto incident to that lawful arrest.3 7
One of the basic elements of a search warrant is probable cause, which
must not be induced by bad faith. Where a search warrant is insufficient
on its face, the search of a car pursuant to it was held to be unreasonable,
since the car was in custody and federal agents had the keys.3 8 Where a
31 Eng Fung Jem v. United States, 281 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1960) (dictum).
32E.g., the auto is within a garage attached of the home of the suspect. Boyd v.
State, 206 Miss. 573, 40 So. 303 (1949).
33 United States v. Marrese, 336 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1964).
34 People v. Case, 220 Mich. 379, 190 N.W. 289 (1922); Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn.
544, 238 S.W. 588 (1922).
35 Porter v. United States, 335 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Eisner,
297 F.2d 595 (6th Cit. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962).
36 Ibid.
37 Brown v. State, 46 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1950).
38 Conti v. Morgenthau, 232 F. Supp. 1004, 1008-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Any search
of an auto locked in a police lot with keys in police custody must be with a search
warrant. Rent v. United States, 209 F.2d 893, 898-99 (5th Cir. 1954). See also supra
note 34.
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policeman had an invalid search warrant and testified that he didn't intend
to arrest the suspect unless he found contraband, the arrest was held to
be incidental to an unlawful search and the evidence suppressed.3 9 It is also
bad faith for a policeman to stop a car on a pretext and get a search warrant
on the basis of a driver's refusal to permit a search, 40 or to make a search
illegally and then get a warrant and make a false return on it.41 Most
searches made in bad faith are unreasonable and will be held unlawful.
A lawful search can be made without a warrant if it is incident to a law-
ful arrest. Professor Orfield states:
One rightfully making an arrest may search the person of the suspected person
to discover and seize any articles... which can be used by the prisoner in effect-
ing an escape or as a means of doing harm 1:0 himself or other persons. Such
search may be extended also to the immediate surroundings of the person
arrested, as a vehicle in which he is found ... 42
In order for the search to be incidental to an arrest, the grounds for
arrest must first be established. Mere questioning of a suspect by an
officer in a public place is not a restriction on liberty of movement equal
to an arrest.43 Coupled with restraint of the person and the exercise of
control over him, the officer must specifically intend to make an arrest.44
While there is a serious question as to whether an arrest occurs at the
moment of stopping a car, it is clear that an order to the driver to follow
the officer to a Justice of the Peace is an arrest.45
39 Melton v. State, 75 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1954).
40 Murphy v. State, 194 Tenn. 698, 254 S.E.2d 97') (1953); State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash.
171, 203 Pac. 390 (1922).
41 State v. One Hudson Cabriolet Automobile, 116 Misc. Rep. 399, 190 N.Y.S. 481
(1921).
42 ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 42-43 (1947). See also
Way, Increasing Scope of Search Incidental to Arrest, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 261, 279:
"Adequate law enforcement in the United States today requires some degree of
incidental search and seizure at the time and place of arrest ...."
43 Brooks v. United States, 159 A.2d 876 (D.C. Mun. App. 1960). See United States
v. Bonnano, 180 F. Supp. 71, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), where Judge Kaufman said: "[Flew
litigants have ever seriously contended that it uas illegal for an officer to stop and
question a person unless he had 'probable cause' for a formal arrest."
44Id. at 77.
45 Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), remanded for a specific finding on
the question of when the arrest occurred. See also Commonwealth v. Strickland, 71
Pa. D.&C. 104 (Ct. Common Pleas 1950); Commonwealth v. Bothwell, 94 Pa. L.J. Rep.
451 (1947). In England, too, the law is clear: "The police have no power to detain
anyone unless they charge him with a specified crime and arrest him accordingly.
... Any form of physical restraint is an arrest .... The police have no power what-
ever to detain anyone on suspicion or for the purpose of questioning him." DEVLIN,
THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 82 (1958).
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The search incident to an arrest must be reasonable. 46 It is limited in
its object to items relating to attack, escape or destruction of evidence
relating to the crime or to any other crime. When the search is for the
fruits and instruments of a felony, seizure of unrelated personal papers is
unreasonable. 47 Items seized incident to an unlawful arrest may not be
used to assist in an unreasonable search under the "fruit of the poison tree"
doctrine.48 The search must be incident to the arrest, not vice versa,
since the latter would result in an arrest based on the discoveries of an
unlawful search. 49
Most important, the arrest must be based on probable cause or reason-
able grounds for the search to be lawful.50 Whether reasonable grounds
exist is a mixed question of law and fact, and each individual case must be
decided on its own facts.51 It does not matter whether the search or the
arrest came first. If there is no probable cause, both are illegal.52 However,
no matter how reasonable the grounds for arrest, if the suspect has fled
the vehicle prior to arrest, a search of it cannot be incident to the suspect's
arrest.53 Where the grounds have been presented to a magistrate and an
arrest warrant has been issued, a search incident to the arrest is lawful, as
the warrant is the highest level of probable cause.54
4 6 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
47 United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1926); People v. Chiagles,
237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923). But see Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192
(1927), as to papers which may be fruits and instruments of another crime.
4SWong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). See also Town of Blacksburg
v. Beam, 104 S.C. 146, 88 S.E. 441 (1916).
49 People v. Margelis, 217 Mich. 423, 186 N.W. 488 (1922). See also People v. Brown,
25 Cal. 2d 640, 290 P.2d 528 (1955).
50 The requirement of reasonable grounds relates to the officer's knowledge or belief
as to whether a violation has been committed. This is the equivalent of probable cause.
51 People v. Exum, 382 Ill. 204, 47 N.E.2d 56 (1943). Boats are treated the same as
any other vehicle for this purpose. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 562 (1927).
5 2 Allen v. State, 183 Wis. 323, 197 N.W. 808 (1924).
53 State v. Naturile, 83 N.J. Super. 563, 200 A.2d 617 (1964). Justice Sullivan, dissent-
ing, felt that hot pursuit came under an "exceptional circumstances rule" since inspec-
tion of the vehicle might have shown where the suspect was fleeing to and leaving
one officer to guard the auto (which was hopelessly stuck in the snow) and sending
the other to get a search warrant would permit the defendant to escape. Id. at 580,
200 A.2d at 626-27. But there is really no problem on these particular facts since both
telephone and police radios were available. Assistance could have been requested by
one partner while the other kept following the fugitive suspect, with little danger
since assistance was so close.
54 See, e.g., Albright v. United States, 329 F.2d 70 (10th Cir. 1964); Toliver v. State,
133 Miss. 789, 98 So. 342 (1923). But see State v. Rowley, 197 Iowa 977, 195 N.W. 881
(1923).
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REMOTENESS IN TIME AND PLACE
There is a problem as to what is incident to the arrest in terms of time
and geographic location. In Agnello v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that the arrest of a suspect could not justify a search of a place
remote from the place of arrest without a search warrant.5 5 The question
must then be asked, How far is remote? Distances ranging from "next
to the front stairs" to a half-block away have been held sufficiently close
to be incident to the arrest.56 But it depends on the jurisdiction and the
circumstances. In a recent California ca;e, the police stopped an auto
near the scene of a recent robbery and made a suspect, who resembled
the description of the robber, get out. It was held that a search of the
auto he was standing against was unlawful because the police had no
reason to suppose that either a car or a confederate were involved. Also,
no formal arrest had been made.57 Much more convincing is United
States v. Marrese where a suspect was arrested, on a charge of desertion
from the military, in the company of a friend in whose room he was stay-
ing. The arrest was made on the ground floor of the rooming house in
which they lived. The court carefully considered the basis for a search
incident to the arrest and reasoned that, since there was no knowledge of
a weapon being used in the desertion, and therefore no evidence which
could be destroyed, and since he and the friend were in custody on the
ground floor, there was no way they could use the contents of the
upstairs room to either escape or attack the officers. Since none of the
three criteria which could justify the search existed, the court labelled
it a "fishing expedition" and suppressed the seized evidence. 58 This is a
well-reasoned approach, requiring officers to justify their acts in light of
the purpose of the search, and is better than decisions which rest merely
on considerations of distance. However, where the distance does increase
beyond the half-block limit imposed in the cases above, there is greater
55 269 U.S. 20, 30-31 (1925). Accord, Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
56 Slade v. United States, 331 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1964) (Per curiam) (jug in weeds
by front stairs near front door of house trailer: ; People v. Daily, 157 Cal. App. 2d
649, 321 P.2d 469 (1958) (car parked fifty or lixty feet away); Ker v. California,
supra note 23 (car in parking lot below apartment where defendant was arrested);
People v. Cicchello, 157 Cal. App. 2d 158, 320 F'.2d 528 (1958) (car half-block away
from apartment where defendant was arrested); and United States v. Jackson, 149
F. Supp. 937 (D.D.C. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 250 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1957)(search of apartment defendants had just left whch was half-block away from car in
which they were arrested).
57 People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P.2d 658 (1963). This case should carry
more weight on the issue of whether an arrest had occurred, to which a search could
be incidental, than on the issue of remoteness by distance.
58 336 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1964).
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likelihood that such cases will be disposed of on the issue of distance
alone.59
The second element of remoteness of a search is time. Most jurisdictions
agree that where there are reasonable grounds for arresting a person, a
reasonable search of his person and the area and vehicle under his control
is justified as incident to the arrest, and the search is not unlawful merely
because it precedes rather than follows the formal arrest.60 The probable
cause for arrest must exist before the search, for if the arrest depends
upon the prior search alone, both arrest and search are unreasonable. 61 If
the search occurs some length of time prior to or after, the arrest, it will be
remote in time and thus held unreasonable.02 However, this restriction is for
the protection of the arrestee and he can waive his right, if he does so
willingly and knowingly. 63 The same criteria apply as to the necessity
for the search as applied above. Thus, if the car is impounded, is no
longer capable of being used in an escape, and the evidence is securely
locked inside, any later search must be by warrant.6 4 The test of re-
moteness in time is relative to arrest, but if the search takes place when
an unconscious person is taken into custody, it will not be remote
merely because a technical arrest could not be made until the person
regained consciousness. 6
The last category of cases dealing with remoteness covers those situa-
59 United States v. Fowler, 17 F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Cal. 1955). Search of defendant's
apartment, two blocks away from the place where his car was stopped, was held too
remote.
60 Husty v. United States, supra note 29, at 700-02; Carroll v. United States, supra
note 27; People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P.2d 531 (1955); People v. Kuntze, 371
Mich. 419, 124 N.W.2d 269 (1963); State v. Hoover, 219 Ore. 288, 347 P.2d 69 (1959).
But see Hurst v. California, 211 F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
61 State v. Collins, 150 Conn. 488, 491-93, 191 A.2d 253, 255 (1963); Gross v. State,
235 Md. 429, 201 A.2d 808 (1964). But see People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d
57 (1956), where officers asked two men to step out of a cab for questioning and one
of them made a motion as if to hide something. The court held that the furtive
motion gave cause to search the cab. But, this doesn't seem to be cause for arrest and
it seems as if the arrest was based on the search and should have been held illegal.
62 Gross v. State, supra note 61 (2 hours prior); United States v. Cain, 332 F.2d 999
(6th Cir. 1964) (3 hours after); State v. Edmondson, 379 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. 1964)
(a second and more thorough search four hours after); People v. Burke, 39 Cal. Rptr.
531, 394 P.2d 67 (1964) (eight hours after); Smith v. United States, 335 F.2d 270
(D.C. Cir. 1964) (tile morning after an arrest made the previous night).
6 3 See Pettas v. United States, 203 A.2d 170 (D.C. Mun. App. 1964). Tile officers
did not search the car at the time of arrest, only because of the arrestee's request
not to be embarrassed before his neighbors. A subsequent search in the arrestee's
presence, performed immediately on arrival at the precinct station, was held reason-
able and lawful.
64 Smith v. United States, supra note 62.
65 Cannon v. State, 235 Md. 133, 200 A.2d 919 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 883.
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tions in which the search is remote from the arrest in both place and time.
There formerly were three different views on such searches, depending
on a close interpretation of the facts in each particular case: (1) one
view held that as long as the arrest was lawful, any subsequent reasonable
search would also be lawful; 6 (2) another held that a search must be
incident to arrest but made an exception. in the case of an auto which
had been impounded. The reasoning behind this view was that, since
taking an inventory of the auto's contents is for the protection of the
arrestee (so that nothing is lost or stolen) and of the police (so that no
false charges of theft can be made), any evidence found is admissible,
since the search which uncovered it was "lawful."0 7 The distinction
between an '"inventory" and a search is, at best, so minor as to be non-
existent. It seems that those courts which adopted it were merely seeking
a way to ease police work at the expense of individual rights. However, if
an inventory is made as a regular part of the administrative procedure of
incarceration, is lawful but the evidence is inadmissible. (3) The last,
and best, view holds that any search remote from the arrest is unreason-
able where at least one of the three criteria previously discussed was not
present.68
Finally, the Supreme Court examined the problems concerning remote-
ness in the important case of Preston v. United States and adopted the
third view. 9 In that case, three men who had been seated in a parked
automobile from 10:00 P.M. until 3:00 A.M. in a business district, were
arrested by city police and charged with vagrancy; after giving an
unsatisfactory explanation of their activities, and admitting that they
were unemployed and had only twenty-five cents among them. Upon
their arrest, the three men were searched for weapons and taken to a
police station. The auto was towed without search to the station and then
to a garage. The glove compartment was tlhen searched and two guns were
found. The officers returned to the station and exhibited the guns, stating
that the trunk was locked. On instructions, they returned to the car,
66People v. Tabet, 402 Ill. 93, 83 N.E. 2d 3:9 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 970(1949); Petti v. State, 207 Ind. 478, 188 N.E. 784 (1934) (auto was found several miles
from the place of arrest); Patrick v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 83, 250 S.W. 507 (1923).
67 People v. Simpson, 170 Cal. App. 2d 524, 339 P.2d 156 (1959); People v. Ortiz, 147
Cal. App. 2d 248, 305 P.2d 145 (1956); State v. Olson, 43 Wash. 2d 726, 263 P.2d 824
(1953). Contra, People v. Burke, supra note 62.
68 Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963); United States v. Stoffey, 279 F.2d 924,
928-29 (7th Cir. 1960); People v. Montgares, 336 I11. 458, 168 N.E. 304 (1929); State
v. Jones, 358 Mo. 398, 214 S.W.2d 705 (1948). See also supra notes 32, 33 and 47. Illi-
nois was one jurisdiction which was inconsistent when faced with this situation. Com-
pare People v. Montgares, supra, with People v. Tabet, supra note 66.
69 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
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entered the trunk, and found the burglarly paraphernalia, which was later
introduced against Preston in his federal trial on charges of conspiring to
rob a federally insured bank. Justice Black delivered the unanimous
opinion of the Court, saying in part:
Common sense dictates, . . that questions involving searches of motor cars or
other things readily moved cannot be treated as identical to questions arising out
of searches of fixed structures like houses.7 0
He reviewed the three criteria saying:
The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the
need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an
officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction
of evidence of the crime-things which might easily happen where the weapon
or evidence is on the accused's person or under his immediate control. But
these justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or place from
the arrest. Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search
made at another place, without a warrant is simply not incident to the arrest.71
The Court then reasoned, assuming arguendo the arrest was valid, that
since the men were in custody and away from the car in the garage, the
search was too remote in time or place to have been made as inci-
dental to the arrest . . . the search of the car without a warrant failed to
meet the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment .... -72
Finally, the Court applied the exclusionary rule and held the evidence
obtained to be inadmissible.7
Preston appears to solve the entire problem of remoteness. It has
already been widely applied to provide solutions in similar cases, as those
states which have used it consider it binding on them through the Mapp
case.
74
In Illinois, two recent cases have applied Preston with the exclusionary
rule. In People v. Catavdella,7 the suspects were arrested for an alleged
traffic violation, at which time, several antique pistols and a camera were
seen in the back seat of their car. After the car had been taken to the
police station, and the three men were in custody, an officer forced open
the trunk and found stolen articles which were later admitted at the
70 Id. at 366 (Emphasis added). 72 Id. at 368.
71 Id. at 367 (Emphasis added). 73 Ibid.
74 See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486-87 (1964), rehearing denied, 377
U.S. 940; United States v. Marrese, supra note 58; Smith v. United States, supra note
62; Rosencranz v. United States, 334 F.2d 738 (1st Cir. 1964); United States v. Cain,
332 F.2d 999 (6th Cir. 1964); Slade v. United States, supra note 56; Sisk v. Lane, 331
F.2d 235 (7th Cir. 1964); Conti v. Morgenthau, supra note 38; State v. King, 84 N.J.
Super. 297, 201 A.2d 758 (1964); State v. Riggins, 395 P.2d 85 (Wash. 1964); State v.
Edmondson, supra note 62.
75 31 111. 2d 382, 202 N.E.2d 1 (1964) (Advance Sheet).
COMMENTS
trial.7 6 The court, through Justice Klingbl.el, held that the search at the
station was unreasonable and invalid when "tested by the standard set
forth in the Preston case," and therefore the trial court erred in admitting
the evidence. 77 People v. Erickson78 ha:aded down the same day as
Catavdella, is almost identical in its factual situation. After a traffic arrest,
the arresting officer saw a brown rubberized cord extending a few feet
out of the trunk of the car. When the arrestees were in custody, and the
car at the station, a police sergeant searched the car and trunk and found
the articles put in evidence at the trial.79 Justice Underwood, writing for
a unanimous court, held the evidence inadmissible under Preston, reversed
the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.8 0
Unfortunately, not every court which has applied Preston has done
so correctly. In People v. Morgan,81 defendants were arrested on two
traffic charges and they and their car were taken to police headquarters.
When the defendants emptied their pockets, the police, seeing they had
large amounts of currency in their possession, suspected a robbery. The
police then searched the car in a nearby police garage, without obtaining
a warrant, and found evidence implicating the defendants in a theft. The
court held that there had been a "second arrest" at the time the police
saw the large amounts of money and that the search of the car was
incident to this second arrest. The objections to this reasoning are: (1)
there can't be a second arrest if the arrestees had never been set free after
the first arrest; (2) the record showed no "second arrest," either formal
or informal, and the state never tried to prove one; (3) there is serious
doubt whether reasonable grounds even existed to validate the alleged
second arrest; and (4) the search was clearly contra the reasoning in
Preston and could only be legal if accomplished pursuant to a search
warrant. Judge Rabin's dissent pointed out that, even if one agreed there
had been a "second arrest," the search wasn't justified, as there was no
possibility of escape, destruction of evidence or attack on the police using
weapons from the car.82
How far can Preston be extended? In Adams v. United States, the
76 ld. at 385, 202 N.E.2d at 3.
77 Id. at 386-88, 202 N.E.2d at 3-5. Justice Schaeffer, with Justice Underwood con-
curring, specifically agreed that Preston controlled and the conviction had to be re-
versed, but they dissented from the majority on the issue of whether to remand or
not. Id. at 389, 202 N.E.2d at 5. -
78 31 111. 2d 230, 201 N.E.2d 422 (1964) (Advance Sheet).
7 9 Id. at 231-32, 201 N.E.2d at 423.
80 Id. at 235-36, 201 N.E.2d at 425.
8121 App. Div. 2d 815, 251 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1964) (Memorandum).
82 Id. at -- , 251 N.Y.S.2d at 506-08.
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appellant urged that the search incident to arrest be precluded as soon
as the suspects are securely in police custody.8 3 The court held:
We recognize, of course, the logic in appellant's argument. After his arrest
there was no danger from unseen weapons or of evidence disappearing from
the locked trunk of the car. The status quo with respect to the trunk could
have been maintained until a search warrant was issued, particularly since
the car itself was impounded by the police. . . . But as far as we are aware,
no court has yet held that a car, including its trunk, may not be searched
without warrant at the time and place its occupants are placed under lawful
arrest. We are not persuaded that we should be the first court to do S0.84
While it would be a break with tradition to so hold, the validity of the
appellant's argument cannot be denied. Once the dangers to the police
are over, and the possibility of escape and destruction of evidence are at
an end, all the exceptions which might justify a search without a warrant
are eliminated. The car should then simply be impounded in the police
lot while a search warrant is sought. This appears to be a very reasonable
procedure, for it would require the state to show probable cause to a
judicial officer, before getting a warrant to search the car, rather than
requiring it only later, when the evidence is sought to be admitted at
a trial. It would not be an undue obstacle, as search warrants are quickly
issued upon proper affidavit, but it would serve as a safety measure,
taken to protect a prisoner who may well be innocent. Some policemen
may become overzealous in pursuing their duties and one more safeguard
would be well appreciated.
Now to explore the types of apparent violations which face the police-
man.
CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS
At common law and in many states today, there are three classes of
criminal violation: felony, misdemeanor and traffic violation or offense.8 5
Each class of violation gives rise to different rules respecting legal arrests.
A person may be arrested if the arresting officer has probable cause to
believe he has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a felony,
and no special words are needed to validate such an arrest without a
warrant.86 This type of arrest must be based on probable cause, and
83 336 F.2d 752 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Per curiam).
84 Id. at 753. But also note that strict interpretation of the rule in Preston can lead
to decisions which are correct as to law but which are unpopular with the public due
to the nature of the crime. See TIME, Feb. 19, 1965, p. 56 cols. 2 and 3.
85 VARON, supra note 22, at 78-83, 89-103 and 194-95.
86 Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220 (Alaska 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859;- People v.
Scott, 170 Cal. App. 2d 446, 339 P.2d 162 (1959); State v. Phillips, 262 Wis. 303, 55
N.W.2d 384 (1952).
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mere suspicion will not suffice.8 7 However, the test of probable cause
will be satisfied where the police officer relies on a radio description, i.e.,
he need not see the crime being committed. 8
In order for an officer to arrest a person for a misdemeanor, the
officer must have positive knowledge of the misdemeanor or see it
committed. s9 Some jurisdictions have said that an officer must have
probable cause to believe that a misdemel nor is being committed in his
presence ° Others require that the probable cause arise from something the
officer has discovered through use of his senses, so that he is actually
aware of something which is probably a misdemeanor.9' It is now well
established that what is seen in a car, under natural light or by use of an
artificial light, can be probable cause in an arrest for a misdemeanor or
felony, and a search of the car incident tD such arrest. 2 The reasoning
behind this rule is that there has been no actual search, "for search
implies invasion and quest, and that implies some sort of force, actual or
constructive.19 3
s7People v. Myles, 189 Cal. App. 2d 42, 10 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1961), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 872 (1962); Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 860 (1920).
88 Silver v. State, 110 Tex. Crim. 512, 8 S.W.2d 144 (1928), rehearing denied, 9
S.W.2d 358.
89 State v. One Hudson Cabriolet Automobile, supra note 41; State v. Wills, 91
W. Va. 659, 114 S.E. 261 (1922).
90 United States v. Kaplan, 286 Fed. 963, 973 (S.D. Ga. 1923); Slusser v. United
States, 270 Fed. 818, 821 (S.D. Ohio 1921); State ex rel. Sadler v. District Court, 70
Mont. 378, 225 Pac. 1000 (1924).
91 State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 145, 195 N.W. 789 (1923); State ex rel. Sadler v. District
Court, supra note 90. Then, there is the situation of a merchant who sees goods being
shoplifted, sees the thief drive away in a car, and calls the police who radio out a
complete description of car and man. When th. police saw the man in the same
car, two hours later, they were unable to arrest him because no misdemeanor had
been committed in their presence. Coakley, supra note 13, at 11. The solution to this
situation is twofold: (1) Give the store the right to reasonably detain any person
who is believed to have committed such an offense las in ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 10-3 (c)
(1963)] or (2) make shoplifting a felony similar to burglary.
92 United States v. Paradise, 334 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1964); People v. Exum, supra
note 51; State v. Griffin, 84 N.J. Super. 508, 202 A.2d 856 (1964); State v. Gianfresco,
(Ohio Ct. App., Mahoning County, Oct. 15, 1963) (not reported), aff'd, 176 Ohio
St. 60 197 N.E.2d 362 (1964) (Per curiam), cert. drnied, 379 U.S. 932, 33 U.S.L. WEEK
3206 (No. 510) (U.S. Dec. 8, 1964); State v. Williams, 237 S.C. 252, 116 S.E.2d 858
(1960); State v. Quinn, 111 S.C. 174, 97 S.E. 62 (i.918); Smith v. State, 155 Tenn. 40,
290 S.W. 4 (1927); State v. Sullivan, 395 P.2d 745 (Wash. 1964). State v. Sullivan is
open to question, however. Judge Donworth's diss, nt points out that in the testimony,
the police officer saw a glass ampoule on the car floor but did not realize it was a
narcotic, until he picked it up and read the narre on it. Judge Donworth felt that
seizing the ampoule, before knowing of an offense, was an unreasonable search. Id. at
748.
93 State v. Quinn, supra note 92, at 180, 97 S.E. at 64. Reaching inside the car door,
as in State v. Sullivan, supra note 92, was an example of constructive force.
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There are some cases which treat this area broadly and speak in terms
of a "criminal offense" and not of felony or misdemeanor. Generally,
these decisions follow the pattern of misdemeanor cases; most of them
turn on whether the crime was committed in the officer's presence. Where
no offense was actually seen (mere uncorroborated information and sus-
picion will not suffice), the arrest and search will be held unlawfulY4 The
United States Supreme Court has held that where two persons were ar-
rested in a car for selling contraband ration tickets (in an entrapment
situation), a search of the car was justified as incident to the arrest. But
the arrest and search of a third occupant of the car was held to be with-
out probable cause, and the Court refused to stretch the Carroll case to
cover it.05 However, there is another line of cases, followed in Illinois,
which permits arrest for an "offense" on reasonable grounds or probable
cause.96 The Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure has adopted this posi-
tion as its new standard for arrest without warrant.9 7 It remains to be
seen whether the abolition of the common law distinctions (the placing
of arrests for misdemeanors on the same level as arrests for felonies) can
pass the Supreme Court as a procedural rule under Ker v. California, or
whether it is a substantive change and must be weighed under Mapp v.
Obio.98
This raises a problem as to what are reasonable grounds for an arrest.
Since there is no general rule, each case must depend on its own facts.09
In Smitb v. United States, it was held:
There must, of course, exist a ground and basis for a federal officer to engage
in stopping a car on a highway. . . . [algents are not free to make general
94 Pickett v. State, 99 Ga. 12, 23 S.E. 608 (1896); People v. Brooks, 340 I11. 74, 172
N.E. 29 (1930). Accord, State v. Pluth, supra note 91, where the court held: "Although
a person may actually be committing a criminal offense, it is not committed in the
presence of an officer ... if the officer does not know it. And where the officer could
not observe or become cognizant of the act constituting the offense by use of his
senses it could not be committed in his presence so as to authorize an arrest without
warrant." Id. at 151, 195 N.W. at 791. (Emphasis added.) See Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307 (1959), as to what constitutes sufficient corroboration of information.
95 United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948).
96People v. Reid, 336 111. 421, 168 N.E. 344 (1929); People v. Swift, 319 I11. 359, 150
N.E. 263 (1925); Thompson, Illinois Search and Seizure Law-The New Frontier, 11
DE PAUL L. REv. 27, 35-36 (1961).
97 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, S 107-2 (1964), reads in part:
"A peace officer may arrest a person when: ...
(c) He has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or has
committed an offense."
Note that the incipient crime, i.e., "about to commit an offense" is not included. See
also ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, S 200-1 et seq (1965).
98 Thompson, supra note 96, at 41.
99 Cannon v. United States, 158 F.2d 952 (1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 839 (1947),
rehearing denied, 331 U.S. 863.
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or capricious interceptions of motorists. Elemmts must be present, of which
the agents have information or knowledge cc.nnected with the car itself, or
with the driver, or with the context given the car and driver by some
special scene or setting, which can reasonably impress, beyond a mere
suspicion, that the motorist is not "going about ordinary affairs" but is
presumably engaged in using the car for [an] improper ...purpose.100
It must also be understood that "[p]robable cause is something more than
mere suspicion and something less than evidence which would justify
conviction."''1 1 The concurrence of the above two rules delimits the area
of probable cause.
A quick study of the case law relating to the three levels of police
knowledge upon arrest, viz., suspicion, probable cause and positive knowl-
edge, will reveal what is actually held by the courts to be reasonable
grounds for arrest and search. Since probable cause is the standard needed
to justify an arrest, mere suspicion, being less than probable cause, will
not justify an arrest and search. 10 2 A simple quick movement by a person
in the back seat of a cab, or a person staring, from a slowly driven car at
a passing motorocycle patrolman, have beer. found to raise only general
suspicion, at most, and arrests and searches based on those situations have
been held patently unreasonable. 10 3 The mere fact that a person enters a
cab in an area of criminal narcotics activity or that a cab passenger has a
criminal reputation will not even create a general suspicion without
something more.1 0 4 Frequently, an initial situation which could arouse
only general suspicion, at most, can, with i:he addition of a few more
suspicious actions, develop into complete probable cause, even though
the initial situation could have an innocent explanation. 05 While mere
100 264 F.2d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1959). Accord, McCarthy v. United States, 264 F.2d
473, 475 (8th Cir. 1959). Cf. Arch v. United States, 13 F.2d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 1926);
and United States v. Coppolo, 2 F. Supp. 115 (D.N.J. 1932), as to boats.
101 Ralph v. Pepersack, 335 F.2d 128, 132 (4th Cir. 1964).
102 United States v. Myers, 287 Fed. 260 (W.D. Ky.. 1923), aff'd, 4 F.2d 1020 (6th Cir.
1925) (Per curiam); Kersey v. State, 58 So. 2d 15!' (Fla. 1952); Robinson v. State,
197 Ind. 144, 149 N.E. 891 (1925). But see People v. Case, 220 Mich. 379, 190 N.W.
289 (1922), wherein it was held that police could brush aside the canvas cover of a
truck on mere suspicion or less, on a regular inspection for liquor on the state fair
grounds while making rounds.
103 People v. Stein, 265 Mich. 610, 251 N.W. 788 (1933); People v. Roache, .237
Mich. 215, 211 N.W. 742 (1927). Contra, People v. Sanson, 156 Cal. App. 2d 250, 319
P.2d 422 (1957).
104 Rios v. United States, supra note 45; People v. McGurn, 341 II1. 632, 173 N.E.
754 (1930).
105 United States v. Copes, 191 F. Supp. 623 (D. Add. 1961), aff'd sub nora., United
States v. Sawyer, 297 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 946 (overheard
phone call about a "stash pickup"); People v. Marrdn, 46 Cal. 2d 106, 293 P.2d 52
(1956) (two men talking in a car in lover's lane); Commonwealth v. One 1955 Buick
Sedan, 198 Pa. Super. 133, 182 A.2d 280 (1962) (alcohol smell coming from a house).
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presence in an area of criminal activity is not reasonable grounds for
arrest, the inability of a person to explain his suspicious actions can
create probable cause.106
Probable cause is an elusive standard, depending so closely on the
actual facts of the case, that it is possible for different courts to reach
different conclusions from the same facts. 1'07 Where the arrestee's actions
may be just as consistent with innocence as with guilt, no probable cause
will be found.108 But, where probable cause does exist, the failure to get
a conviction for the offense suspected will not void a search incident
to the arrest, or render inadmissible anything discovered thereby which
proves a different offense. 10 9 Beck v. Ohio has recently reaffirmed the
principle that mere uncorroborated information that a person would be
at a certain place and commit an offense does not rise to the level of
probable cause. 110 But, reliable detailed information, if corroborated by
the officers witnessing the details described, will constitute probable
cause for the stopping of a suspect auto and arrest and search of its
occupants."' There is a point beyond which suspicious acts rise to the
level of probable cause. Where an action which is only capable of
arousing general suspicion is persistently followed, it can attain the
level of probable cause. 112 Then, too, there is a range in valid probable
cause cases, from those with weak facts that are little better than sus-
picion, to others which have facts so strong they border on positive
knowledge. 113
10People v. Faginkrantz, 21 Ill.2d 75, 171 N.E.2d 5 (1960). (defendant was found
near a car at 4:30 A.M. and stated he had pulled into the alley in order to defecate
but he could not prove ownership of the car.) See also People v. Lewis, 187 Cal. App.
2d 373, 9 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1960) (car sped away with lights out as police approached).
107 Compare United States v. One OX-5 American Eagle Airplane, 38 F.2d 106
(W.D. Wash. 1930) (probably cause) with State v. Kinnear, 162 Wash. 214, 298 Pac. 449
(1931) (no probable cause). These two cases are the forfeiture action and criminal
appeal which grew out of the single seizure of Kinnear's airplane for illegal transporta-
tion of whiskey during Prohibition.
108 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). See generally Barrett, supra note 15,
at 59-67.
109 People v. Roach, 44 Misc. 2d 40, 253 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1964).
110 379 U.S. 89. But see Draper v. United States, supra note 94.
"' Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); King v. United States, 1 F.2d 931
(9th Cir. 1924); Combs v. Commonwealth, 271 Ky. 794, 113 S.W.2d 438 (1938). Cf.
Draper v. United States, supra note 94.
112People v. Minchella, 268 Mich. 123, 255 N.W. 735 (1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S.
619, 294 U.S. 717 (1935).
11 Compare People v. Myles, supra note 87; People v. Brajevich, 174 Cal. App. 2d
438, 344 P.2d 815 (1959); and Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn. 554, 238 S.W. 588 (1922)
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Some states have tried to improve or replace this standard with the
test of good faith, 11 4 but the Supreme Court has refused to use this test
by itself, on the grounds that it leaves too much to the discretion of the
police."' Until the Supreme Court passes cn more cases involving prob-
able cause and the reasonableness of state procedures, under the doctrines
of Ker and Draper, the practitioner must continue to find his authority
in the stare decisis of his own jurisdiction. If he attempts to change his
jurisdiction's approach, he will have to trudge through a morass of
conflicting authority which cannot yet be ignored. His attempt to
present consistent authority with facts similar to those of his own case
may even be met with contrary authority from the same jurisdictions.116
Positive knowledge is a higher standard than probable cause, and a
few cases have required this standard in arrests for misdemeanors. 1 17
Positive knowledge usually exists when the arresting officers have actually
seen the contraband to be seized, or have tro.pped the suspect by offering
to purchase some of the contraband and then having him appear as
agreed. 118 Where the officer only accosts the suspect in order to question
him, and the suspect freely admits he is in possession of contraband, the
officer then is held to have positive knowledge which will justify an
arrest for possession of contraband. 119
There are statutory exceptions to the probable cause requirement in
the areas of customs, immigration and revenue. 120 The broad power to
with Adams v. United States, supra note 83; United States v. Cangelose, 230 F. Supp.
544 (N.D. Iowa 1964); Edwards v. State, 196 Md. 233, 76 A.2d 132 (1950); State v.
Hoover, supra note 60; Commonwealth v. Czajkowski, 198 Pa. Super. 511, 182 A.2d
298 (1962). Consider the situation in Pinder v. United States, 4 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.
1925) as to whether probable cause existed or not before the offer to bribe the inspector.
114 Houck v. State, 106 Ohio St. 195, 140 N.E. 112 (1922); Epps v. State, 185 Tenn.
226, 205 S.W.2d 4 (1947). See supra notes 38-41.
115 Beck v. Ohio, supra note 110, at 97; Henry v. United States, supra note 108, at 102.
116 The best collections of these probable cause cases, with emphasis on the juris-
dictions involved, are VARON, supra note 22 and Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 715, 721-46 (1963).
Valuable discussions will also be found in Barrett, supra note 15, and Comment, supra
note 13, at 908-12.
117 See supra note 89.
118 Lafazia v. United States, 4 F.2d 817 (1st Cir. 1925); Altshuler v. United States,
3 F.2d 791 (3d Cir. 1925); Reyff v. United States, 2 F.2d 39 (9th Cit. 1924).
119 Daisen v. United States, 4 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1925) (motorboat); State v. Gul-
czynski, 32 Del. 120, 120 Atl. 88 (1922); Blager v. State, 162 Md. 664, 161 Atl. 1 (1932).
But see Epps v. State, supra note 114, where the stopping was held to be an arrest not
made in good faith so that the suspect's statement: "Ya got me," was held inadmissible
and could not, therefore, be the basis of positive knowledge.
120 Most of the cases on revenue involve ships and vessels. Generally, the cases and
statutes give a government official the right to board a vessel within the United States'
territorial waters, inspect the manifest, and observe the cargo. If from the inspec-
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search, without even unsupported suspicion, random vehicles and per-
sons at points of entry, given to customs and immigration officials is an
analog to the power to search vessels. 121 While no one has ever success-
fully questioned the right of the government to make this search, a
problem arises over the definition of "port of entry".122 Prohibition
statutes also fell within the exception, when they were in force.123
One of the risks inherent in such statutes is that the law enforcement
agencies will seek a friendly forum and the attempt to expand the power
allotted to them.124 Another risk is that some judge may overlook the
cardinal rule that the finding of the object searched for cannot legalize
an unreasonable search.' 21 Texas has passed a statute which permits
searches without warrant for narcotics in other than private residences. 126
tion, or other things giving rise to probable cause, the official believes that a revenue
or customs act is being violated, or another crime is being committed, he can then
arrest the master and search and seize the vessel and her cargo. See Cook v. United
States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933); Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927); Wood v.
United States, 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 342 (1842); The Appollon, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 362
(1824); The Atlantic, 68 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1933); United States v. Coppollo, 2 F. Supp.
115 (D.N.J. 1932); The Barracouta, 42 Fed. 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1890). For statutory author-
ity, see generally Tarriff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. S 1581; Act of March 2, 1917, c. 146, 39
Star. 969, 970; Act of July 18, 1866, c. 201, § 3, 14 Stat. 178; Act of March 3, 1815, c. 104,
§ 2, 3 Star. 231-32; Act of July 31, 1789, c. 5, § 24, 1 Star. 29, 43.
121 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1964) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1958).
122The discussion in Comment, supra note 13, is excellent. The author shows
his desire to limit the broad power as it clearly appears to have been abused in
practice. The Fifth Circuit has shown a propensity for extending this power to
the "100 mile border" authorized by 8 C.F.R. § 287.1. The Ninth Circuit, following a
more enlightened path, has cut the "border" to 60 miles or less on the basis of reason-
ableness. 51 CALIF. L. REv. at 913-14 (1963). Probable cause applies after entry has
been completed and searches too far from the border are unreasonable if not based
on probable cause or done during hot pursuit. Id. at 919-20. See also Cervantes v.
United States, 263 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1959), aff'd on later appeal, 278 F.2d 350 (9th
Cir. 1960).
123 Husty v. United States, supra note 29; Carroll v. United States, supra note 27.
124 See supra note 122, and notes 185 and 192 infra.
125 Henry v. United States, supra note 108. See, e.g., United States v. Batemen, 278
Fed. 231, 235 (S.D. Cal. 1922), where the court said: "It is my opinion, therefore, that
it is not unreasonable for a prohibition enforcement officer to stop automobiles upon
the public highway and search them for intoxicating liquors without a warrant, and
the finding of the liquor justified the search."
126Article 725b, § 15, Tex. Penal Code art. 725b, § 15 (1961), provides in pertinent
part: "Officers . . . shall have power and authority, without warrant, to enter and
examine any buildings, vessels, cars, conveyances, vehicles or other structures or
places, when they have reason to believe and do believe that any or either of same
contain narcotic drugs ... contrary to ... this Act... except when any such building,
vessel or other structure is occupied and used as a private residence, in which event
a search warrant shall be procured as hereinbelow provided." Quoted in PAULSEN
AND KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 753 (1962). The next paragraph of the
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This statute requires no showing of probable cause but uses "reason to
believe," which seems like a throwback to "good faith." Other states
equate this phraseology with probable cause, but that does not appear
to be intended here. It appears that the legislators have attempted to
render the statute constitutional on its face. However, since the statute
does not require probable cause as a test for "reason to believe", and
since this test must be met under Mapp and Ker, it is likely that this
statute will be held unconstitutional upon scrutiny by a high court.
This could be accomplished by a revival of the venerable rule of State
v. McCann, where a blanket power to enforce a prohibition statute
was modified by the court to permit seizure only of that material which
could be seized without an unreasonable search such as the Constitution
prohibited.127
In order to have a lawful search, the stopping of the auto and the
search itself must not be unreasonable. The stopping is unreasonable
where it is done by shooting at the car or its tires, when the suspects
have not used deadly force or committed a forcible felony. 12 8
Lastly, a search without probable cause may be held reasonable if the
defendant voluntarily consented, with specific knowledge that the evi-
dence may be seized and used against him. It will be held unreasonable if
there is no consent. 1929 The issues, in such cases, are whether defendant's
actions constituted a knowing consent, and whether it was freely given.
As in the case involving probable cause, there is equal authority for both
sides of each issue. Thus, defendant's silent failure to object to the search
statute confers power to stop persons and to open any package they are carrying
and determine if it contains narcotics. Contra, People v. Brown, 45 Cal. 2d 640, 290
P.2d 528 (1955).
12759 Me. 383, 385 (1871).
128 United States v. Costner, 153 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1946); United States v. Cotter, 80
F. Supp. 590 (E.D. Va. 1948); United States v. Kaplan, supra note 90, wherein Judge
Barrett said: "The enforcement of a law by the impairment of rights may be too
costly. The repeal of a wise and good law may ba brought about by its harsh and
reckless enforcement. Officers, above all others, should observe the law. They should
not, as a result of undue enthusiasm or by narrowed vision, wrongfully trespass upon
the rights of others. They should not lose a proper sense of relative values of rights
and duties. They should not, for instance, jeopardize lives by firing at automobiles
in the hope of puncturing tires, when a slight misaim may result in death, even
though the automobile might be occupied by a violator of the law. Especially, should
this be foreborne when inevitably, at times, mistakes will be made, and a car shot
at will be occupied by those who are entirely innocent. It must not be forgotten
that the innocent may be apprehensive of attack from others than officers of the
law, and may . . . conscientiously believe that their only safety is in flight. A fleeing
automobile may be in defiance of the law, but a btdly aimed shot may be murder."
(Id. at 974.) See also Rochin v. California, supra not-. 46.
129 People v. Foreman, 218 Mich. 519, 188 N.W. 375 (1922); Butler v. State, 129
Miss. 778, 93 So. 3 (1922).
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has been held to be consent in one case whereas the search was held unlaw-
ful and to have no effect in another.130 The next issue is whether the
consent was an acquiescence to the superior power of the police or
whether it was freely given. Again, this depends so much on the facts
that the differences among viewpoints become extreme. 131 It does not
matter what words defendant uses in acquiescing. If they are not freely
given, they will not be construed as consent.1 2 In State ex rel. Brancbaud
v. Hedman,33 the actions of the defendant, who was in a car parked in
a razed area of the city, made the officers suspicious. As they went to
question him, they saw that his trunk was secured by a hasp and padlock.
The officers asked if they could look in the trunk and Branchaud either
,gave them the keys or opened it himself. The court held that since there
was no coercion, Branchaud's actions were voluntary and the search was
lawful.'3 4
TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS
Except for prohibition offenses, most of the offenses discussed above
were felonies, while most traffic violations are misdemeanors. 35 This
section will cover moving violations (serious and minor), licensing, and
registration violations and violations involving parked and immobile ve-
hicles. No added problems on arrest are presented here as all but one
case (noted here) have been discussed above. 3 6 Arrest warrants are
130 Compare United States v. Waller, 108 F. Supp. 450 (N.D. 111. 1952) (consent),
with Taylor v. State, 129 Miss. 815, 93 So. 355 (1922) (no consent).
131 Compare People v. Thomas, -- Cal. App. 2d -- (Cal. Dist. Ct. App., 2d App.
Dist., June 22, 1964) (unreported?), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964), 33 U.S.L.
WEEK 3216 (No. 531) (U.S., Dec. 15, 1964), where a trial court believed the statement
of the four arresting officers that while they were frisking the defendants, the latter
freely gave their consent, with the decision in State v. King, 84 N.J. Super. 297, 201
A.2d 758 (1964), wherein defendant was arrested and questioned without intimidation
in a squadrol by two officers immediately behind the building in which he lived and
the search was struck down on the dual grounds that his acquiescence wasn't freely
given and that the auto was too remote from the place of arrest.
132 Salata v. United States, 286 Fed. 125 (6th Cir. 1923). Accord, Graham v. State,
86 Okla. Crim. 9, 184 P.2d 984-85 (1947) ("It looks like you're running things so go ahead
and search"); Pritchett v. State, 78 Okla. Crim. 67, 143 P.2d 622-23 (1943) ("You don't
have to have a search warrant, just go ahead and search"); Denton v. State, 62 Okla.
Crim. 8, 70 P.2d 135-36 (1937) ("That is just fine and dandy, come right ahead").
It could be argued that all of the above lend themselves to a sarcastic tone of voice,
but see Smith v. State, 34 Okla. Crim. 434, 246 P. 1109-10 (1926) ("Go ahead and search,
there is no whiskey here").
'33 130 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. 1964).
134 Id. at 631. But see, Edwards v. State, 83 Okla. Crim. 340, 177 P.2d 143 (1947).
'35 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951, §§ 3-812 (a), 4-106(a), 5-601, 6-401(a) and (b),
8-123, UART S 137, par. 239.11 and par. 239.21, § 4 (1963). A few traffic violations are
serious enough to be felonies: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951, § 4-106b; ch. 38, par. 9-3 (b) (1963).
136 See supra notes 43, 44 and 45. But cf. Robertson v. State, 184 Tenn. 272, 198 S.W.2d
633 (1947), where it was held that any stopping and detention of an automobile by an
officer constituted an arrest.
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not much of a problem here because the;e violations are mostly misde-
meanors for which a person is not usually taken into custody.'37
Searches of autos incident to arrest for traffic violations present grave
problems when judged under the three criteria of a proper search. These
problems arise especially from the criterion which justifies search to
prevent destruction of the fruits or instruments of the crime. 1 s Except
for drunken driving, where the alcohol may be considered an instru-
ment of the crime along with the car, 13 9 c:here are no other instruments
for a traffic violation, and the only fruit, if any, may be a small savings
of time for the driver. The car will not be impounded in such a case,
and time cannot be seized. The courts have made good use of this
reasoning, and some of them discuss it specifically.140 Search of the
person is a different matter, however, as it usually rests on the other
two criteria. 14 1
In Brinegar v. State, it was recognized that many law abiding persons
are guilty of traffic violations because:
There are one-way streets, no-parking zones, zones restricted to parking of
particular kinds of vehicles, zones restricted to pedestrian traffic, no-left
turn corners, some left turn after stop, some by mere arm signal. In some
places a tail light signal is sufficient to indicate a turn or a stop, and other
137 See Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961), where defendant
committed two minor traffic violations (failure to signal a right turn and having faulty
brake and parking lights) and a warrant for his arrest was issued the following day.
The warrant was really a subterfuge to permit the officers to search defendant's room
for narcotics as an incident to his arrest. Judge Orr held:
"[T]he search must be incident to the arrest and not vice versa .... It is quite ap-
parent that the attempted arrest of appellant under the traffic warrants falls within
this latter evil: the traffic warrant was being used a:; a mere excuse to search appellant.
... It is a matter of common knowledge, and it was admitted by one of the arresting
officers at the trial, that it is not ordinary police procedure to physically take a person
into custody for a minor traffic violation ... especially when no traffic ticket or citation
has theretofore been given." (Id. at 265.) (Emphasi; in original.) See supra note 54.
138 See People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247, 254-55, 97 N.W.2d 16, 20 (1959). Note
that only in hit-and-run, collision, and similar cases is the car a true instrument of the
crime.
139 See Agata, Searches and Seizures Incident to Traffic Violations-A Reply to
Professor Simeone, 7 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 36 (1962).
140 Ibid. However, the evidence in Gonzales was admitted under a special state statute
concerning concealed weapons. Compare Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203, 116 S.W.2d
1009 (1938), with State v. Deitz, 136 Wash. 228, 239 Pac. 386 (1925). In Deitz, what are
the fruits of driving without lights and license plate!;?
141 People v. Thomas, 31 111. 2d 212, 201 N.E.2d 413 (1964) (Advance Sheet); Elliott
v. State, supra note 140. See Lane v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1964) (Ad-
vance Sheet) which held that arrest for a "traffic or other minor violation . . . does
not give to the officer absolute right to search the vehicle . .. indiscriminately." But,
the court warned: ". . . this opinion should not be construed to mean that a person in
custody may not be searched in order to be disarmed, or to prevent escape or the
immediate destruction of evidence for which he was detained." (Id. at 745.)
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places require an arm signal; there are various lanes in some metropolitan
areas, some restricted exclusively to various classifications of traffic, and
requiring a genius to get out of after once getting in, without violating
the law.142
This case is but one of many which have not based their decision on the
three criteria, but have held as a rule of law that minor traffic offenses
alone will not justify a search of the offender's car, and the use of the
offense as a pretext for search will be held unreasonable.143 Some of these
cases have also held a search of the person to be unreasonable in the
absence of a good faith belief that the motorist was armed, dangerous or
apparently intended to escape. 144 There are some states which merely
applied the general rules for arrest and held that searches of person and
auto, incident to traffic arrest, are valid.145 However, while neither posi-
tion is in a clear majority (there being mediate positions held by other
states), the trend is clearly toward limiting the power to search. 140
Where a traffic violation is coupled with "other circumstances which
may reasonably infer the commission of a more serious crime,"'1 47 or
if there can exist a good faith belief that the officer may be in danger
or the offender escape, a search of the person and car may be reasonable. 148
As Justice House said in People v. Tbonias:
When, however, the circumstances reasonably indicate that the police may
be dealing not with the ordinary traffic violator but with a criminal . . .the
police officers were justified in searching defendant and the area under the
142 97 Okla. Crim. 299, -- , 262 P.2d 464, 474 (1953).
143 Illegal turn: People v. Molarius, 146 Cal. App. 2d 129, 303 P.2d 350 (1956); People.
v. Catavdella, 31 111. 2d 382, 202 N.E.2d 1 (1964); State v. Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638,
374 P.2d 989 (1962). Crossing the center line: Collins v. State, 65 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1953);
Brown v. State, 62 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1952); Graham v. State, 60 So. 2d 186 (Fla.
1952). Failure to stop: Ippolito v. State, 80 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1955); People v. Zeigler,
358 Mich. 355, 100 N.W.2d 456 (1960). Faulty lights: People v. Erickson, 31111. 2d 230,
201 N.E.2d 422 (1964); People v. Gonzales, supra note 138. Passing on a curve: Burley
v. State, 59 S. 2d 744 (Fla. 1952).
144 Brinegar v. State, supra note 142. Cf. Simeone, Search and Seizure Incident to
Traffic Violations, 6 ST. Louis U.L.J. 506, 518 (1961).
145 See cases collected in Simeone, id. at 512.
146 Of the nineteen cases in Simeone, supra note 144, eight of them were decided
before World War II and three of the six states named are included here as ones
which have joined and even sparked the trend towards limitation. Cf. Agata, supra
note 139, at 1.
147 Einhorn, The Exclusionary Rule in Operation-A Comparison of Illinois, Cali-
fornia and Federal Law, 50 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S. 144, 157 (1959).
148 Simeone, supra note 144, at 517. Agata, supra note 139, at 2. See also Haverstick
v. State, 196 Ind. 145, 147 N.E. 625 (1925).
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front seat for their own protection before taking him to the police station
for the traffic offenses. 149
The next group of violations stems from the power of the govern-
ment to license drivers and vehicles. 5 ° The refusal or inability of a
motorist to display a valid driver's license is prima facie evidence that
he does not have one, but the charge will be dropped if he can present
one in court.'5 ' While the police have a right to demand the display of a
driver's license, they must exercise the right in good faith. 152 But, if the
request to inspect the license is merely being used as a pretext to search the
motorist, then, like the minor traffic offenses above, the arrest or stopping is
unlawful, and any subsequent search is illegal. 153 If the arrest is not a pre-
text, but a valid arrest for a traffic offense for which a summons may ordi-
narily issue, the failure of the motorist to display a valid driver's license
is usually taken, by both police and cour:s alike, to raise the situation
to one in which the motorist can be taken into custody and a search
made. 54 The offense of allowing an unauthorized driver to operate one's
auto seems to be excepted by the courts from this harsher treatment if
the owner of the car was present in it and was carrying a valid driver's
license.155 The apparent difference in treat:ment seems to be related to
149 31 Ill. 2d 212, 213-14, 201 N.E.2d 413, 414 (1964), wherein the defendant was
stopped at 5 A.M. for faulty tail lights, had no license and had just been released from
prison. See State v. Quintana, 92 Ariz. 267, 376 P.2d 130 (1962) (defendant stopped for
speeding when there was reasonable suspicion that car was stolen); People v. Zeravich,
30 Ill. 2d 275, 195 N.E.2d 612 (1964) (defendant stopped for driving with obstructed
vision, reasonably fitted description of suspected turglar); People v. Esposito, 18 II.
2d 104, 163 N.E.2d 487 (1959) (defendant stopped due to unilluminated license plate
and other occupant of car fled). But cf. United States v. Butler, 156 F.2d 897 (10th Cir.
1946). There is a good collection of cases on what gives reasonable cause in such situ-
ations in Annot., 89 A.L.R. 2d 715, 734-46 (1963). Sme also infra note 180.
150 Croson v. District of Columbia, 55 D.C. App., 122, 2 F.2d 924 (1924). See ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 951, § 6-101 through § 6-103, § 6-301 through § 6-306, and § 6-401 (1963).
15' State v. Farren, 140 Ohio St. 473, 45 N.E.2d 413 (1942); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 95 ,
S 6-118 (1963). Note, however, that the law does not yet require a driver to carry
his license.
152 Cornish v. State, 215 Md. 64, 137 A.2d 170 ('1957) (officers reasonably believed
that defendant's license had been revoked).
153 Byrd v. State, 80 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1955); Kraemcr v. State, 60 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1952);
Murphy v. State, 194 Tenn. 698, 254 S.W.2d 979 (1953); Robertson v. State, supra
note 136; Cox v. State, 181 Tenn. 344, 181 S.W.2d 338 (1944). See also supra note 143.
154 People v. Thomas, supra note 149; People v. Morgan, supra note 81; State v.
Griffin, supra note 92; State ex rel. Tessler v. Kubiak, 257 Wis. 159, 42 N.W.2d 496
(1950). Contra, State v. Riggins, supra note 74. The same majority principle applies
where a truck driver is unable to produce the registration papers. See United States v.
Bumbola, 23 F.2d 696 (N.D.N.Y. 1928); Graham v. State, supra note 132.
155 People v. Erickson, supra note 78; State v. Scanlon, 84 N.J. Super. 427, 202 A.2d 448
(1964).
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probable cause in general and to the specific likelihood that one bent on
a criminal activity would not bother with the formality of a license
and also would likelier be driving a stolen car.
The last group of cases concerns parking violations and other searches
of immobile vehicles. The development of the law, in these cases, is
shown by a complete reversal of position in Illinois from 1950 to 1960.
In People v. Edge, it was held that an arrest for blocking an alley and
driving without a safety sticker would justify an arrest of a person and
a search incidental to arrest.'50 This is the early view, presented above,
that an arrest for any offense justifies a search. In People v. Clark, de-
fendant was arrested for a violation of a municipal parking ordinance
and the officer saw a package in Clark's pocket and when he asked about
it, he was told that it contained policy slips.' Then, in People v. Watkins,
the court held that a search incident to arrest must be based on the
three criteria and without the presence of at least one, an arrest for a
minor traffic offense which would ordinarily only result in a "parking
ticket" would not raise an inference which would justify a search of
the car or person.158 The court also overruled the Clark and Berry cases
insofar as they were inconsistent with this opinion even though, on the
specific facts before them, they held the search of Watkins justified. 159
The major fault with the Watkins case is that the two cases it over-
ruled are justifiable as searches on the grounds of positive knowledge.
In Clark, the actual search and seizure did not come until the policeman
had asked about the bulging pocket and Clark had voluntarily admitted
that he had policy slips. Clark's protection would have been to remain
silent and then the rule in Watkins would apply. In Berry, the officer saw
the passing of the policy slips as he was walking over to make the traffic
arrest and thus had positive knowledge before there was any illegal
arrest or search.160 The same day, the court also handed down its de-
156 406 111. 490, 94 N.E.2d 359 (1950).
157 9 I1l. 2d 400, 137 N.E.2d 820 (1956). See People v. Berry, 17 111. 2d 247, 161 N.E.2d
315 (1959). When the officer approached defendant to arrest him because he had
neither safety sticker nor license plates, he saw another occupant of the car give
defendant a package of policy slips and then opened the car door and seized the package
while informing the defendant he was under arrest for the traffic and policy violations.
158 19 Ill. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833. Watkins had been
arrested for parking too close to a crosswalk.
159 Ibid. See also People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 239 P.2d 57 (1956).
160 But cf. State v. Brooks, 57 Wash. 2d 422, 357 P.2d 735 (1960). Officers could have
seen the stolen clothing in the back of the car by shining a flashlight and then the
arrest would have been proper. But they had opened the door to check the registration
and then saw the contraband and made the arrest on the basis of what they saw.
The court's decision to admit the evidence must be strongly questioned as it is really
an example of an arrest based on an unlawful search.
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cision in People v. Mayo.161 There, the decision, based on the rule
in Watkins, was clearly correct. An officer arrested defendant, as he
got out of his car, because his wheels were too far from the curb and
then the officer searched the car and found policy slips although at no
time did anything happen that was unusual or suspicious that could
qualify under the three criteria.16 2 This reasoning also considers that if
the person had not been just getting into or out of the car, the officer
would have just left a summons or a ticket and never formally arrested
the motorist. Then, too, if the car were immobile and incapable of being
driven away, even though the crime is serious, a search warrant would
have been required.163
ROADBLOCKS
Roadblocks present severe problems as to reasonable methods of search
and balancing of public safety and private right. One text has suggested that
there are only three reasonable grounds for using a roadblock: (1) dis-
covering criminals fleeing from the scene of a crime known have been
committed, (2) stopping traffic violators fieeing from officers in pursuit,
and (3) halting motorists for the purpose of checking driver's license,
registration, weight-load, and compliance with the safety provisions of
the state's motor vehicle law.0 4 Justice Jackson stated in Brinegar v.
United States:
Undoubtedly, the automobile presents peculiar problems for enforcement
agencies, is frequently a facility for the perpetration of crime and an aid in
the escape of criminals. But if we are to nake judicial exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment for these reasons, it seems to me they should depend
somewhat upon the gravity of the offense. If we assume, for example, that a
child is kidnapped and the officers throw a roadblock about the neighborhood
and search every outgoing car, it would be a drastic and undiscriminating
use of the search. The officers might be unable to show probable cause for
searching any particular car. However, I should candidly strive hard to
sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it might be
reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to
save a threatened life and detect vicious crime. But I should strain to sustain
161 19 II1. 2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960).
162 Ibid. See Williams v. Commonwealth, 261 S.W.2d 807 (Ky. 1953), and Jackson
v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 562, 330 S.W.2d 616 (1960), where cars were severely blocking
the road with an incoherent or drunken person inside. Here searches on arrest of
the person for public drunkenness were deemed reasonable but the Williams conviction
was reversed on other grounds.
163 See Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923) (car burned after collision);
compare State v. One 1921 Carillac Touring Car, 1!7 Minn. 138, 195 N.W. 778 (1923)
(car turned over after collision).
164 DONIGAN & FxSHER, KNOW THE LAW 238-46 (1958). See generally, Comment, supra
note 13, at 914-17.
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such a roadblock and universal search to salvage a few.bottles of bourbon and
catch a boodegger. 6 5
The way to achieve the desired result would be to limit the first category
to felonies instead of all crimes. It would be better yet to limit it to
forcible felonies as it is the peril to life which makes a dangerous crime
more heinous. It is here that the public safety is most endangered, espe-
cially in the person of the victim. Maryland has imposed a further con-
dition on roadblocks used to catch criminals. It insists that those who
conduct roadblocks be given full descriptions of the fleeting felons and
that the officers making the actual arrest have a reasonable belief that
those stopped are the felons involved. 16 0
Further safeguards for the private person come from the application
of the principles of reasonable arrest. Thus, mere suspicion will not
serve as grounds for stopping and search." 7 In United States v. Bonnano,
the police set up a roadblock and cordoned off a large area around a
house where there had been a meeting of many known mobsters (the
Apalachin Conspiracy). 168 The police stopped all cars leaving the
area in order to ascertain the identities of the occupants. Because
there were so many cars, some persons were taken to the station and
were questioned there, but no one was detained over one-half hour. The
court, in ruling on the issue of whether there had been any violation of
the defendant's rights, held that "simple interrogation" will not amount
to an arrest where the delay is insignificant.16 9
Another type of roadblock is that used to check for drunk drivers or
bootlegging. These are more in the nature of general arrests and searches
but have been supported by at least one writer on the theory that they
are analogous to an auto safety check. 70 However, their exploratory
nature really renders them unreasonable. Drunken driving is better de-
tected by the erratic route of the car and not an unreasonable, humiliating
and lengthy test administered before fellow citizens of a possibly inno-
cent motorist.' 7 ' Also, there is much to indicate that the effectiveness of
165 338 U.S. 160, 182-83 (1949) (dissent).
166Williams v. State, 226 Md. 614, 174 A.2d 719 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 855
(1962); Freedman v. State, 195 Md. 275, 73 A.2d 476 (1950). More on the cordon
arrest will be found Comment, supra note 13, at 916.
167 Kersey v. State, supra note 102.
168 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
169 Id. at 79-81. However, there is a serious question here as to the use of cordon
methods on grounds which amount to no more than suspicion. There is also much
contrary authority on the issue of arrest. See supra notes 43, 44 and 45.
170 Comment, supra note 13, at 917 n. 86.
171 Ibid.
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such searches is so small that they are really not worth the money which is
spent on them.17 2
Roadblocks for license and equipment checks are no different than
other types of license checks discussed above. The important require-
ment is that they be conducted in gool faith. In Commonwealth v.
Mitchell, after affirming a conviction for driving without a license dis-
covered by means of a roadblock check, the court said:
Let it be emphasized that we are dealing here with systematic and indis-
criminate stopping of all motor traffic on :he highway for the good faith
purpose of' making inspections of drivers' licenses. Our decision may not
be regarded as sanctioning the stopping of ca:s for the ostensible or pretended
purpose stated when in reality it is actuated by an ulterior motive not related
to the licensing requirement, or is done as a pretext or as a subterfuge for
circumventing the constitutional provisions against searches of persons and
property without a valid warrant. We shall continue to condemn such an act. 178
The requirement that drivers be licensed is for the safety of the public
as users of the road. The public is already extremely unsafe due to the
high number of collisions and other accidcnts today.17 4 Furthermore, un-
less the driver is so unsafe as to always drive erratically and recklessly,
the offense is only observable at a roadblock or at a check made at the
time of some other traffic offense. 75 The :roadblock is useful but it must
be closely watched so that it is not extended. It must be subject to the
test of good faith and, if and when the faith is broken, it must, and will
be curbed.1'7 6
FRISKING
As mentioned above, there are three criteria which justify a search
incident to arrest. Perhaps, the most important of these is the one based
on the safety of the officer. His safety is directly related to that of the
public and if he is attacked, the public is greatly endangered. Generally,
criminals will refrain from attacking an officer of the law, while they
might attack an ordinary citizen so as to perpetrate a robbery, etc. This
is partly because of the particular vigor -with which the police pursue
an attacker of their brother officers and partly because they are aware
172 FooTE, 4th Amendment-Obstacle or Nece.'sity in the Law of Arrest, POLICE
POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 29, 33-34 (Sowle ed. 1960, 1962). Of the three opera-
tions for which figures are given, the smallest had an effectiveness of 0.25%, the middle
sized one of 1.51% and the largest (157,000 cars stopped) of 0.63%. There is also seri-
ous question as to how many of these arrests were formal enough to stand up in court.
173 355 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Ky. 1962).
174 In Brinegar v. State, supra note 142, at 474, Judge Powell observed: "The death
rate from motor accidents rivals that of our severcst wars."
175 Comment, supra note 13, at 915.
176 Cf. Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 193 P.2d 470 (1948); City of Miami v.
Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784, 788-89 (Fla. 1959); Coakley, supra note 13, at 11-14.
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that the policeman is able to resist strongly. But such attacks do take
place, and even when the offense is only a traffic violation, a deranged
motorist may shoot an arresting officer. 177 In order to protect against such
occurrences, the "frisk" has come to be widely applied. Its nature was
explained by Orfield when he said:
At common law, an officer has no right to search a suspect before arresting
him. But this rule antedated criminals with four inch pistols. . . . [A] peace
officer may search for a dangerous weapon any person whom he has stopped,
whenever he has reasonable ground to believe that he is in danger if the
person possesses a dangerous weapon. If he finds a weapon, he may keep it
until the completion of questioning, when he shall either return it or arrest
the person. An officer has authority, incident to a lawful arrest, to search
the prisoner after the arrest. The justification is the officer's safety, and that
seems as applicable to "frisking." 178
The rationale behind the frisk is best explained by Judge Bergan in People
v. Riviera:
If we recognize the authority of the police to stop a person and inquire
concerning unusual street events we are required to recognize the hazards
involved in this kind of public duty. The answer to the question propounded
by the policeman may be a bullet; in any case the exposure to danger could
be very great. We think the frisk is a reasonable and constitutionally permis-
sible precaution to minimize that danger. We ought not, in deciding what
is reasonable, close our eyes to the actualities of street dangers in performing
this kind of public duty ...
The frisk . . . is a contact or patting of the outer clothing of a person to
detect by the sense of touch if a concealed weapon is being carried.
It is something of an invasion of privacy; but so is the stopping of the
person on the street in the first place. . . . The sense of exterior touch here
involved is not very far different from the sense of sight and hearing-senses
upon which police customarily act....
From the time the policeman, in the process of frisking defendant, touched
the object, inferred by him correctly to be a gun, there was probable cause
to arrest defendant and to proceed at once to further invade his clothing and
take the gun.1 79
The frisk must still meet the standards of reasonableness and where
there is no reason for it, any evidence found will be suppressed. i80 The
177 Chicago Sun-Times, Dec. 17, 1964 (editorial).
178 ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 25-26 (1947). This is taken
from a discussion of the UNIFORM ARREST ACT, § 3.
179 14 N.Y.2d 441, 446-47, 201 N.E.2d 32, 35-36, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 462-63 (1964).
See People v. One 1958 Chevrolet, 179 Cal. App. 2d 604, 4 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1960);
People v. Lewis, 187 Cal. App. 2d 373, 9 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1960); People v. Pugach, 15
N.Y.2d 65, 204, N.E.2d 176, 255 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1964) (Advance Sheets).
18 0 See State v. Collins, 150 Conn. 488, 491, 191 A.2d 253, 255 (1963). But see, People
v. Pugach, supra note 179. Judge Fuld's dissent in Pugach points out that when a person
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best case on this aspect of the frisk is Barnes v. State.'8' Barnes was stopped
at night for having faulty brakelights and arrested for the violation after
it was demonstrated to him. One of the officers told him that they were
justified in searching him and his car and he said "Go ahead. I am clean."
A search of the car and a frisk of Barnes turned up a small quantity of
marijuana and a few cigarette papers. Ba::nes was taken into custody
on a narcotics charge. The court first held that the "consent" to the
search was without effect as Barnes was deemed to have reason to believe
that he would be searched even if he objected. 182 The court then said
that while frisking was a good and necessary practice, it must be con-
ducted reasonably. The reasonable frisk of Barnes ended when the police
were done patting him down in their search for weapons. The court
held that since the marijuana was discovered by the later unlawful search,
and not the lawful frisk, it must be excluded as evidence. 83
SOLUTIONS AND CRITICISMS
More than at any other time in this century-, we are warned of the danger
of becoming a police state. Well qualified writers agree that the fourth
amendment must be more strongly applied to protect the personal in-
terests which are attacked by unlawful arrest: and disagree only on whether
the amendment is being treated as a second- or a third-class right.18 4 The
problem is not entirely new, and not only the police are at fault. Appre-
hensive legislatures may pass overly cauticus laws which are enforced
by zealous officers and heard by judges whxo fail to see their unconsti-
tutionality.18 5
In its decision to adopt the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court of
California said:
Today one of the foremost public concerns is the police state, and recent
history has demonstrated all too clearly how short the step is from lawless
is "detained" in the back seat of a squadrol for quest: oning, it is not necessary to "frisk"
his briefcase. Putting it on the floor in the front of the car will sufficiently protect
the police since it is beyond the suspect's reach .nd nothing contained in it could
be used to attack the officers. (Id. at 68-69, 204 N.E2d at 178, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 836-37.)
18125 Wis.2d 116, 130 N.W.2d 264 (1964) (Advanced Sheets).
182 1d. at -, 130 N.W.2d at 266-68.
183 Id. at - 130 N.W.2d at 269. See People v. Thomas, supra note 149, where a frisk
of the person and a search of the section of the car in which defendant would ride
to the police station were held reasonable as a protection for the police.
184 Barrett, supra note 15, at 70; Way, supra note 42, at 279.
185 See Quivers v. Commonwealth, supra note 28 (where a statute was held to
authorize the sheriff to enter any vehicle without worrant and conduct a police inspec-
tion); and State v. Lutz, 85 W. Va. 330, 101 S.E. 434 (1919) (where an overzealous
officer felt he needed no authority to stop any perscn on the street without cause).
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although efficient enforcement of the law to the stamping out of human
rights.'86
The right of privacy and the presumption of innocence complement
each other under our adversary system of law. While both have recently
been under attack, they are also being better defended than ever before.
In People v. Martin, Justice Carter warned:
[T]o say the very sight of two men in a parked automobile at night warrants
a police investigation reminds one of the Gestapo. Since when has there been
a curfew for adults? Since when has it been illegal for two men to converse
at night in a parked automobile? Since the deplorable practice of "bugging"
• . . has become so prevalent, almost the only place two businessmen, who
wish their conversation to remain private, can be safe is in an automobile on
a sparsely travelled street or other secluded place. . . . It is a matter of
common knowledge that it has been the practice of law enforcement officers
of this state to make searches of the persons and property of individuals
whenever they saw fit regardless of whether reasonable or any cause existed.
. . . The American way of life does not lend itself to such totalitarian
practices. There is no place in our body politic for the Gestapo, the storm
trooper or the commissar. Ours is a system of ordered liberty which is made
more secure by placing a magistrate between the citizens and the overzealous
law enforcement officer. 187
Mere police suspicion must be ineffectual in the face of a perfectly
plausible and probable explanation consistent with innocence. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, in a later case, reaffirmed the presumption of
innocence and issued a reminder to the police that this presumption is
for the prosecution to rebut by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 88
Uniform Arrest Act.-Individual rights must be safeguarded in the
face of these new attacks. Yet the rise in crime must be controlled with
stronger statutes which will permit the law to deal sternly with these
offenders. Chicago Police Commissioner Orlando Wilson, a strong pro-
ponent of the Uniform Arrest Act (UAA), believes the act to be such
a statute:
Law enforcement may be strengthened by legalizing common police practices,
already legal in some jurisdictions which would have the effect of facilitating
the discovery of criminals and evidence of their guilt and of lessening the
exclusion of relevant evidence from their trials. The police should be author-
ized to question persons whose actions under the circumstances then existing
186 People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.. 2d 434, 447, 282 P.2d 905, 912 (1955).
18746 Cal. 2d 106, 109-10, 293 P.2d 52, 53-54 (1956) (dissent). But a car can be
"bugged" too, and though it was held to violate defendant's right to counsel, the conver-
sation in Massiah v. United States still was not private. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Modern
technology seems to render the right to privacy obsolete in the absence of physical
protection against encroachment.
188 People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253, 294 P.2d 13 (1956).
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are such as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be seeking an
opportunity to commit a crime. A police officer should be privileged to search
a suspect for weapons when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that
he is in danger. . . . Should the suspect be unable or unwilling to explain
satisfactorily the reason for his presence or actions, the officer should be
authorized to take him to a police station and hold him while the investigation
is continued for a period of two hours, without placing him under arrest....
The police should be authorized to hold an arrested person before bringing him
before a magistrate for at least 24 hours, excluding days when courts are not
in session....
Suspects should be denied the right to resist illegal arrest by a person the
suspect has reasonable grounds to believe to be a police officer ....
These are essentially the provisions of the Uniform Arrest Act ....
The reasonable arrest privileges mentioned would facilitate the achievement
of objectives in law enforcement desired by all persons except the criminals
themselves. The privileges would enable the police to exercise such control
over persons in public places to enhance the peace and security of all citizens.
[T]he inconvenience of two hours of detention short of arrest is experienced
only by the innocent person who inadvertently or by poor judgment is found
in a situation that arouses police suspicion ... .189
The two references to suspicion are extremely worrisome to the liber-
tarian. Probable cause must not be discarded in favor of the officer's mere
suspicion! The Supreme Court has said:
The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording
the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often
opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforecement.
To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the
officers' within or caprice.190
An arbitrary two-hour restriction of freedom of movement is not less
than an arrest. No person should be liable to such a detention for merely
refusing to indulge one officer's whim as to the arrestee's possible guilt.191
Wilson urges that suspicion, if formalized by an arrest, be sufficient to
hold a man for twenty-four hours. There must not be a return to the
arbitrary detention of the "small-book system" where a man could be
worked on until he broke, or if there were a time limit (as here), be
coerced or interrogated more intensely in crder to break him more quick-
ly.19 2 While the Supreme Court has clearly struck down such actions,
189 0. W. WILSON, POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 21, 26-27 (Sowle ed. 1960,
1962). (Emphasis added.) Cf. supra note 178.
190 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. at 176 (1949). A good discussion of why mere
suspicion is an impractical standard in the UAA is in Coakley, supra note 13, at 16.
191 See Brooks v. United States, supra note 43. As mere silence means nothing in law,
the citizen has always had the right to remain silent.
192 See Note, Constitutional Law-Right to Counsel-When Does It Accrue?, 14
DE PAUL L. REv. 187, 189, 191-94 (1964).
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there are those who refuse to change. 193 Illinois has clearly repudiated
the UAA approach. 9 4
The only provision of the UAA worth using, in its present form, is
the one concerning resistance to arrest. This is a logical approach to a
difficult problem. Earlier cases have held that a man has the right to
protect himself; however, too often the resisting force was fatal to
one party.195 Death is too high a price to pay for what may well have
been a mistake on both sides. The states should ban the use of force in
resisting arrest for the safety of the officer and the citizens.196 But, this
must be coupled with a statute requiring an immediate appearance before
a magistrate so as to quickly rectify any possible mistake.9 7 Only if the
individual can be assured of a quick release, will he be willing to permit
an arrest which he knows to be unlawful.
If the UAA is eliminated as too harsh upon the suspect, a new solution
must be found. The new Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure attempts one
in a very good codification of the existing laws.198 But, it permits an arrest
for an offense (which may be less than a felony) which is not committed
in the officer's presence by the wording:
A peace officer may arrest a person when: . .. [hle has reasonable grounds
to believe that the person is committing or has committed a crime.199
Illinois has adopted the three criteria in its statute on searches without war-
rant, but split the third criterion into two sections: one on the fruits of
the crime and another on the instruments, or tools of it.
20 0
The Harvard Act.-Another solution is Harvard's An Act to Authorize
193 See INBAU & REIn, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIoNs 207 (1962), where
an interrogation of "several hours" is urged. Chicago's shameful history is easily seen in
the sequences: Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528
(1963); and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). See also Hunt, Commander Hart-
nett's Jungle, Chicago Tribune, March 7, 1965, § 7 (Sunday Magazine), p. 14, where
it is made painfully clear that the Chicago Police Department continues to casually
and frequently violate the constitutional rights of suspects and other citizens as a matter
of routine. Cf. supra note 185 and infra notes 221 and 222.
194 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 109-1 and 109-2 (1964).
195 Tillman v. State, 81 Fla. 558, 88 So. 377 (1921); State v. Lutz, supra note 185.
In both of these cases, the force was deadly.
19 6 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 7-7 (1964).
19 7 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S§ 109-1 and 2 (1964).
198 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, arts. 107 and 108 (1964).
199 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 107-2c (1964). This wording completely avoids the
problem of defining "vehicles" as in the Harvard Act, infra.
200 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 108-1, (c), (d) (1964). The inclusion in § 109-1d of "which
may constitute evidence of, an offense" might be unconstitutional under Morisson v.
United States, 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958). (Emphasis added.)
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the Search of Vehicles which covers on'y searches without warrant.20 1
Section 1A, on search incident to arrest, sets out in good language the
same principles which the Illinois legislature aimed at in its new Code
of Criminal Procedure. Except for the two small faults noted above, the
'Code succeeded. This section of the Harvard Act is without such a flaw.
It even specifically provides for the situation where there is a discovery
of a second crime during the search for the fruits of the first one.20 2
However, section 1B of the Harvard Act 20 3 is a dangerous return to
the obsolete principles in Carroll v. United States, set down some forty
years ago.20 4 This section of the Act would permit the search of any
vehicle which was moving, or about to be moved, which the officer has
probable cause to believe contained contraband, stolen property, or any
articles which could be, have been, or are being used to commit a crime.
The grant of power to search is broader than in section 1A and the dif-
ference seems to be unjustifiable.205 In the memorandum in support of
the act, the authors concentrated too heavily on the fact that the search
was prior to arrest in Carroll.206 While the authors do admit that
this approach has been strongly questioned, their assertion that the prin-
ciple has been affirmed is erroneous. The cases they cite only affirm the
Carroll principle of search incident to arrest even though the actual
search be prior to the formal arrest. This section would allow the search
alone and that has never been approved. 2( 17 The probable cause insisted
on is the same as would suffice for an arrest. Yet the authors are worried
that a formal arrest would inconvenience the citizen while the search
would not.20 8 No police force would let the violator go free and merely
seize the contraband. They could simply stop the vehicle, as in Illinois,
arrest the driver on probable cause and then make a search incident to
the arrest.
The "Stop-and-Frisk" Statute.-New York recently passed an act
which legalizes frisking after an officer stops a person "in a public place
whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about
to commit a felony" or certain misdemeanors and may demand
that the person identify himself and explain his actions.20 9 If the officer
reasonably suspects he is in danger, he may search for a dangerous
weapon and keep it, or any other contraband, until the questioning
201 1 HARV. J. ON LEGISLATION 51 (1964).
202 Ibid. Accord, Marron v. United States, supra note 47, and United States v. Eisner,
supra note 35.
203 Supra note 201, at 51-52. 200 Supra note 201, at 60.
204 267 U.S. 132, 158-59 (1925). 207 Ibid.
205 Supra note 201, at 52, and note 97. 208 Supra note 201, at 63.
209 N.Y. CODE o CRIM. PROC. § 180-a (McKINNEY ed. 1964).
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is over when he shall "return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such
person. '210 This "stop-and-frisk" statute has caused great controversy,
especially over the same issue of reasonable suspicion on which the UAA
has been attacked.211
One of the earlier remedies for the citizen suggests a possible modi-
fication of the "stop-and-frisk" statute. Unlawfully seized evidence which
was contraband could not be replevied because there could be no
property right in it. It was thus held both forfeit to the state and ad-
missible as evidence. 212 Under the present day effect of the exclusionary
rule, it would be contraband which had been seized and forfeited
to the state which was capable neither of replevin nor admission into
evidence. The fault with the "stop-and-frisk" statute is that while it im-
poses on a person's right of free movement for the benefit and safety of
the policeman, it then permits the conviction of the stopped person for
the possession of something which the policeman had no right to
search for, had it not been for the statutes, permitting mere suspicion as
a ground for a frisk only to protect the policeman. Thus the statute harms
a person's right of privacy for one purpose, and when that purpose has
been served, it reverses and tramples the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. There is a way to safeguard the policeman while not impinging on
the person's rights, save for the forfeiture of contraband.
A New Standard.-The privilege of frisking can be regulated by a statute
which would clearly limit the harm done to individual rights. In Frank
v. Maryland, the Court upheld a law permitting searches of buildings
for violations of the local health laws because the search was made
reasonably and its scope was limited to observed violations of the health
laws. 213 In State v. Buxton, a law permitting the state fire marshall and
his deputies to enter any building, property or premises at any reason-
able hour for an inspection and investigation as to the origin of a fire,
was held not to permit an inspection to obtain incriminating evidence
against the property owner without first getting a search warrant.214
210 Id. at § 180-a, par. 2. Accord, supra note 178. Contra, infra note 215.
211 W. I. Siegel, The New York "Frisk" and "Knock-Not" Statutes: Are They
Constitutional? 30 BROOKLYN L. REV. 274 (1964). Contra, Comment, The "No-
Knock" and "Stop and Frisk" Provisions of the New York Code of Crininal Procedure,
38 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 392, 398-405 (1964).
212 Silva v. McAuley, 135 Cal. App. 249, 26 P.2d 887 (1933), rehearing denied, 27 P.2d
791. But cf. Azparren v. Ferrel, 44 Nev, 157, 191 Pac. 571 (1920), for when return-
able property could still be held for trial under state law. Cf. State v. Pluth, supra
note 91. See House Bill 1078, infra note 215.
213 359 U.S. 360, 366-68 (1959). See also Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263
(1960); Dist. of Columbia v. Little, 95 App. D.C. 242, 246, 178 F.2d 13, 16-17 (D.C. Cir.
1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
214 238 Ind. 93, 148 N.E.2d 547 (1958).
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These cases are concerned with laws which permitted a search for a
special purpose only, under more liberalized standards than would nor-
mally prevail. But as soon as any possibility arose that the special purpose
was no longer the reason for the search, but a crmiinal prosecution was
fomenting, the special purpose exception was no longer operative and
regular criminal process had to be resorted to.
Frisking can be covered by such a special purpose statute. The police-
man would be able to frisk a person whom he has reason to suspect may
use a dangerous weapon to attack him and escape. This would be lim-
ited to frisking only, so that a search, as in Barnes, or as in use in Illinois
currently, would be unlawful.215 Any contraband found would be for-
feit, unless the person could prove that he had a right to the possession
of it. But it would not be admissible in evidence against the person. This
would overturn the special statute in People v. Gonzales which made
the illegally seized gun admissible. 216 The frisk could then apply to traffic
offense stoppings as well as roadblocks. Thus, if a car were searched at a
blockade post during a cordon to stop a kidnapper, and policy slips were
found, the slips could be confiscated, but the person would go free.
In cases like People v. Thomas,217 the search of the interior of the car
would be considered a frisk as it would not have been allowable except
for the safety of the officers. This would seem to legalize the present
practice of unlawfully stopping a known violator just to take whatever
contraband he may have with him, with the full realization that the court
will merely exclude the contraband and dismiss the prosecution. 218 If the
frisked person sued for false arrest, he would be entitled to a recovery
in law, but would probably be unable to get one from the jury because
of his reputation. The courts would have co be extra wary and prevent
such practices by insisting on a rigid adherence to the requirements that
there be a reasonable fear of attack. There would have to be a strong
215 See supra notes 183 and 200. See 74th Ill. Gen. Ass. H.B. 1078 and proposed
amendments.
217 See supra note 149. 216 See supra note 138.
218 It has been asked whether this would permit o. sexually deviant policeman to have
greater access to possible improper touching of women. This should not really cause
any problems. Such an accusation, if proved, would result in immediate dismissal.
It is not the practice in Chicago, and most cities to have policewomen accompany
patrolmen on their rounds, and it will not be necessary. When a woman has to
be searched, in Chicago, the arresting officer will either call for a policewoman or
call for assistance in safely taking the suspect into a precinct station to be searched
by the matron. This is generally the present practice in such cases and will merely
continue. But see, Chicago Tribune, supra note 192, at 26, col. 2.
There is no way to protect against homosexual incidents of this type. However,
such occurrences are so rare and so quickly dealt with that they do not merit con-
sideration here. Cf. Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288 (1962),
for another aspect of this problem.
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administrative control which would act against any officer who persistently
broke the standard and frisked indiscriminately and unreasonably.
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Frank v. Maryland, referred to the
thousands of health inspectors who carry out inspections without incident:
And in all these instances the number of prosecutions was estimated to
average one a year. Submission by the overwhelming majority of the populace
indicates there was no peril to the health program. One rebel a year (cf.
Whyte, The Organization Man) is not too great a price to pay for main-
taining our guarantee of civil rights in full vigor.210
But one policeman's life per year (actually more) is too great a price to
pay in a single city or state, or in the entire nation. The few "rebels" per
year must be stopped before they increase the nation's population of
police widows. The policeman must be given some of the protection to
which he has long been entitled. The citizen would still have a host of
remedies available, under this statute, against violation of his rights. 220
CONCLUSION
This is a period of increasing crime and of great danger to the public
safety and to the individual persons who constitute the public. 221 More
than ever before, this increase in crime must be combatted. Many police
forces stand in need of improvement. Citizens must help them so they
can be staffed with men who can intelligently interpret and apply the
constitutional safeguards which are likely to be overlooked during a
period of increased police activity. 222
219 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 384 (1958). (Emphasis in original.)
220 Remedies available to the citizen are: (1) Prosecution must show probable cause:
Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943); (2) The exclusionary rule: Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1960);
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955); People v. Brocamp, 307 111. 448, 138
N.E. 728 (1923); Dalton v. State, 230 Ind. 626, 105 N.E.2d 509 (1952); (3) Taxpayer's in-
junction: Compare Wirin v. Horrall, supra note 176, with City of Miami v. Aronovitz,
supra note 176; (4) Suit for false arrest: Toledo v. Cowenberg, 99 Ohio App. 165,
131 N.E.2d 682 (1955) (a traffic summons is not an arrest however); (5) Local statute
regulating police: Price Municipal Corp. v. Jaynes, 113 Utah 84, 191 P.2d 606 (1948)
(but statute was struck as unconstitutionally vague because it used the general words
of the fourth amendment); (6) Tort: Mitchell v. Hughes, 104 Wash. 231, 176 Pac. 26
(1918) (where fellow officers were joined on theory of conspiracy to set up a road-
block). Consider also the federal legislation proposed in Taft, Protecting the Public
from Mapp v. Ohio Without Amending the Constitution, 50 A.B.A.J. 815 (Sept. 1964).
221 J. Edgar Hoover, The Role of the Citizen in Law Enforcement, 2 FED. LAWYER
No. 2, p. 5 (Feb. 1965). See also V. Wilson, Suburbs Pace National Crime Increase,
Chicago Sun-Times, March 10, 1965, p. 10.
222 J. Edgar Hoover, supra note 221, at 6: "The day has long passed when all that
a law enforcement officer required was good intentions. Today's officer must be
fully informed .... [Hie must protect the safety and rights of all parties concerned."
See also Judge Barrett's rule in United States v. Kaplan, note 131 supra, at 974: "Liberty
